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The paper provides an alternative explanation for the “resource curse” based on the income 
effect resulting from high government current spending in resource rich economies. Using a 
simple life cycle framework, we show that private investment in the non-resource sector is 
adversely affected if private agents expect extra government current spending financed 
through resource sector revenues in the future. This income channel of the resource curse is 
stronger for countries with lower degrees of openness and forward altruism. We empirically 
validate these findings by estimating non-hydrocarbon sector growth regressions using a 
panel of 25 oil-exporting countries over 1992–2005. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
In the present paper, we propose a new explanation for the “resource curse.” The resource 
curse refers to the paradox that countries tend to have lower economic growth the more they 
are endowed with natural resources (e.g., Sachs and Warner (1997, 2001)). Our explanation 
is based on the fact that private agents expect to benefit from future government current 
spending financed through natural resource revenues. This reduces private saving and 
investment, hampering growth of the private sector in resource rich countries. 
 
There are several existing explanations for the resource curse. The most notable explanation 
is that the exploitation of natural resources triggers the so-called Dutch disease. Wijnbergen 
(1984) and Corden (1984), among others, provide theoretical frameworks in which the 
decline in the competitiveness of the non-resource sector is caused by an appreciation of the 
real exchange rate due to increased resource revenues spent on non-tradable goods. Another 
explanation for the resource curse is the institutional channel explanation. Tornell and Lane 
(1999), and more recently Robinson et al. (2006), provide theoretical frameworks whereby 
rent-seeking behavior to acquire resource revenues undermines institutional arrangements in 
place, leading to lower economic growth. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2004) provide 
empirical evidence for the relevance for the latter explanation.2  
 
Despite its conceptual plausibility, the empirical evidence for Dutch disease is mixed and is 
mostly on a country case basis. For instance, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) fail to 
find evidence of Dutch disease in Nigeria. The most extensive cross-country studies of the 
Dutch disease are Gelb and al. (1988) and Spatafora and Warner (1995). They find no 
evidence of Dutch disease in the manufacturing sector using various samples of oil-exporting 
countries. The existence of price controls, government intervention and labor market 
flexibility have been suggested as potential explanations for the lack of real exchange rate 
appreciation following an increase in spending (e.g. IMF (2007a)). For instance, price 
controls sterilize the inflationary pressure that could have otherwise resulted in a Dutch 
disease. In turn, price controls shift the burden of the adjustment to the government budget 
with potential consequences on the level of private investment. 
 
This paper complements the existing literature by providing a novel explanation for the 
resource curse. We develop a simple theoretical framework that underpins the income effect 
channel of the resource curse. We also extend the model to show that the income channel of 
the resource curse is stronger for countries with lower degrees of openness and forward 
altruism. To the best of our knowledge, no such income effect channel has been put forward 
as an explanation for the resource curse.3 We empirically validate the main findings by 
                                                 
2 Other explanations based on the volatility of revenues from natural resources and on resource rich countries’ 
excessive borrowing have also been put forward as a possible explanation for the resource curse (e.g. Hausmann 
and Rigobon (2004)). 
3 A related but distinct literature emphasizes the non-productive nature of certain categories of spending (e.g. 
Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000)). 
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estimating non-hydrocarbon sector growth regressions using a panel of 25 oil-exporting 
countries over 1992–2005. 
 
Table 1 shows that current government spending in oil-exporting countries increased over the 
past years, amounting to 36 percent of non-hydrocarbon GDP over 1999-2005. It should be 
noted that a number of oil exporting countries in the recent years have also embarked on 
large public investment plans in order to boost private investment in the non-hydrocarbon 
sector, as shown in Table 1. In the present paper, we do not attempt to investigate the impact 
of public investment on private sector growth. 
 
Table 1. Composition of Government Expenditures in Oil Exporting 
Countries
Total Expenditures and net Lending 
Current Expenditure 
Wages 2/
Interest 3/
Capital Expenditures 
memorandum items
Total revenue
Hydrocarbon revenue 
Source: Ossowski and al (2008)
2/ Due to missing observations. Azerbaijan and Nigeria are excluded to allow for comparability between years averages.
3/ Due to missing observations, Iran and Nigeria are excluded to allow for comparability between years averages.
Averages as share of non-oil GDP 1/
1/ Angola and Equatorial Guinea are two excluded outliers. Due to missing observations, Kazakhstan, Russia and Timor-Leste are excluded 
to allow for comparibility between years and across items averages.
32.8
53.0
37.6
13.7
2.8
15.1
74.5
53.7
13.4
3.2
10.8
51.6
34.4
33.6
14.0
4.9
8.2
38.9
20.0
13.6
3.9
10.9
53.9
2005
47.2 42.0 47.2
1999-2005 1999 2003
36.0 36.2
 
 
Figure 1 provides some possible empirical evidence for the income effect channel of the 
resource curse. It shows that there is a negative relationship between non-hydrocarbon GDP 
growth per capita and current expenditure as a share of non-hydrocarbon GDP, on average 
over 1992–2005. This suggests that the income channel explanation is potentially an 
important explanation for the resource curse given the high level of current spending in oil-
exporting countries. 
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Figure 1. Non-Hydrocarbon GDP Growth and Government Current Spending 
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We have organized the paper as follows. Section II presents the theoretical model. Section III 
reports our empirical results using non-hydrocarbon sector growth regressions. Section IV 
concludes. 
II.   A SIMPLE MODEL 
A.   Closed Economy 
We begin with the standard life cycle model. Suppose that at each period there are two 
coexisting generations, young and old, each with population of size N. The old do not supply 
any labor. Each young owns a unit of labor, which she supplies to the market inelastically. 
Therefore, the total labor supply would be equal to N in each period. There is only one type 
of good, which can be either consumed or invested.  
 
At time t, denote the wage bill of a young individual by wt, her consumption by cyt, and her 
saving by at , all in units of the consumption good. In addition, each young individual 
receives a government transfer of gyt , in units of consumption good.  
 
Each individual who is young at time t becomes old at time t+1. This individual is referred to 
as a member of “generation t.” An old individual of generation t invests the entire savings of 
her young age in time t+1. Denote the capital stock due to this investment by kt+1. An old 
person receives a total interest payment of rt+1kt+1, where rt+1 is the real interest rate at time 
t+1. In addition, she receives a transfer of got+1 from the government. She consumes cot+1 at 
the end of period t+1.  
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The lifetime budget constraint of a generation t individual would equate the present values of 
her lifetime consumption and income. Define gt as the value of transfer to a generation t 
individual (gt = gyt + got+1/(1 + rt+1)). Her lifetime budget constraint will be: 
 
 cyt + cot+1/(1+rt+1) = wt+ gt [1]
 
Suppose a generation t individual enjoys lifetime utility of , where α is a 
parameter that captures the marginal propensity to consume (mpc). A higher α implies a 
stronger taste for consumption when young, which leads to lower saving.  
 
 1 1otytt ccu
 
Each individual maximizes her utility subject to her lifetime budget constraint. The solution 
to this problem for a generation t individual would determine cyt and cot+1 as functions of the 
parameters of the utility function, wage and interest rate, as follows:  
 
 cyt = α(wt +gt) [2]
and 
 cot+1 = (1- α)(1 + rt+1)wt+(1- α)gt [3]
 
The economy has a Cobb-Douglas production function: , where Y, K, and L 
represent economy’s total output, capital and labor respectively, and A is the total factor 
productivity. At market equilibrium, interest rate and wage rate would be equal to marginal 
products of capital and labor, respectively: 
  1tttt LKAY
 
 1  tttt kAmpkr  [4]
 
  tttt kAmplw )1(   [5]
 
As capital becomes more abundant (relative to labor), the reward to capital decreases and the 
reward to labor, the wage rate, increases. 
 
All of the assets accumulated in each period will be invested in the following period: 
 
 )(1 ttyttytyttt gwgwcgwk    [6]
 
Replace for wt from equation [5] above, and write gt in terms of its components to find the 
economy’s equation for evolution of capital (transition equation) as follows: 
 
 
1
1
1 1
)1()1)(1( 

  ottytttt
g
r
gkAk    [7]
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This equation suggests that the transition path of capital will be higher if more transfers are 
made to the young, and lower if more anticipated transfers are made to the old.4 This is 
intuitive, as transfers to savers encourage more (less) capital accumulation (consumption), 
whereas transfers to spenders encourage more (less) consumption (capital accumulation). In 
what follows, we study different possibilities for financing transfers and their impact for the 
capital accumulation in the economy:5 
 
 Case 1 (Resource Curse): gyt=0 and got+1>0 
In this case, natural resources are sold internationally to finance transfers to domestic 
consumers (the old) only. No transfers are made to the savers (the young). Figure 2 depicts 
the transition path without transfers and with transfers to the young. In this case, the 
transition path of the non resource sector of the economy with transfers is lower than without 
transfers, hence resources have caused a curse. 
 
                         Figure 2. Transition Paths 
 
                                                 
4 The latter claim could be verified by rewriting the transition equation as follows: 
ytttot
tt
t gkAgkA
k )1()1)(1(
1 1111
1 
 
  
. The right-hand-side of this equation is 
predetermined at time t+1. Therefore, noting that β-1 is negative, an increase in got+1 can only lead to a decrease 
in kt+1. 
5 We assume that the old-age transfers are anticipated by the beneficiaries when young. Otherwise there would 
be no income effect at play. 
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 Case 2 (Resource Blessing): gyt>0 and got+1=0 
This case is the opposite of Case 1. Resources are sold to finance transfers to savers (the 
young) only. No transfers are made to consumers (the old). Figure 2 above illustrates that the 
transition path with transfers to the young is higher than the transition path without such 
transfers. In other words, transfers to the young will be a blessing for the economy’s growth. 
 
 Case 3 (tax the young and subsidize the old): gyt<0 and got+1>0 
In this case, the savers (the young) are taxed to finance transfers to the consumers (the old). 
Similar to case 1, the non resource sector of the economy will have a lower transition path 
than in the absent of transfers. This holds whether the budget is balanced (gyt = -got) or not. 
 
 Case 4 (subsidize the young and tax the old): gyt>0 and got+1<0 
In this case, the consumers (the old) are taxed to make transfers to the savers (the young). 
This is similar to Case 2, and opposite to case 3; the non resource sector will have a higher 
transition path than in the absence of transfers. 
 
Cases 1 and 2 show that the natural resource curse (or blessing) could be due to how natural 
resource revenues are spent potentially generating an income effect. This is different from 
other explanations for resource curse explained in the literature, such as the Dutch disease. 
Governments can “reverse the curse” by policies that motivate increased private capital 
accumulation and decreased current expenditures. It is clear from Cases 3 and 4 above that 
this policy recommendation is no different from advice on management of revenues from 
taxation. 
 
B.   Openness and Resource Curse 
In this subsection, we show that the more open an economy is, the less it would be prone to 
have a resource curse through the income effect channel.6 This is shown by studying a small 
open economy framework with restrictions on the pass-through of foreign capital inflows.7 
Openness is only studied on capital, as our single commodity model is not proper for 
studying commodity trade. While our main interest is the case of the small open economy, 
Appendix C provides the model’s extension to the larger open economy case, which can be 
of interest when considering regional integration between countries with similar size, but that 
are closed to the rest of the world.  
 
Consider the possibility of foreign capital flows to an otherwise closed economy. The 
transition equation will be modified as below: 
 
                                                 
6 This is also the case for the Dutch disease channel: the smaller the size of the non-tradable sector is (i.e., the 
more open an economy is) the less prone it is to Dutch disease. 
7 In the case of a small open economy without any capital mobility restrictions, there is no impact of natural 
resources redistribution on the dynamic of capital. 
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 f
tot
t
ytttt kgr
gkAk 11
1
1 )1(
)1()1)(1( 

 
   [8]
where,  is the (per capita) foreign investment. It is a function of domestic interest rates, as 
follows: , 
f
tk 1
f
tk  )( 111
world
t
closed
t rrf   0

closedr
f . Further assume that capital cannot flow 
beyond kkt
max,
1
f )1(   where, ]1,0[  is the measure of the country’s restrictions on cross 
border capital mobility and k is the steady state level of capital in the closed economy. For 
the case of de jure fully closed economy 1 , and for the case of de jure fully open 
economy 0 . 
 
Next, we will discuss the effect of an increase in current expenditures on capital 
accumulation. Consider an increase of 1 otg in transfers to the old. This leads to an increase 
in interest rates and immediate capital inflows. If 1
1
1
max,
1 1 
  ott
f
t
f
t gr
kk  , i.e. if the 
amount of foreign capital in the economy is much below the maximum allowed, foreign 
capital inflows neutralizes the effect of the current expenditure on domestic capital 
accumulation, leaving growth unchanged.8 Otherwise, foreign capital will flow into the 
country up to the maximum level of , and the capital loss due to this expansion in 
capital expenditure would be: 
f
t
max,
1k
0)(
1 1
 tr 1
max,
1   ftftot kkgLoss    
 
while Loss is positive, it is a decreasing function of . We can thus conclude that 
increased openness (higher ) reduces the extent to which the income effect dampen 
capital accumulation. 
f
tk
max,
1
f
tk
max,
1
 
C.   Altruism and Resource Curse 
This subsection shows that a higher degree of forward altruism dampens the income effect 
channel of the resource curse while backward altruism strengthens it. Two types of altruism 
are considered: the old individuals transfer part of their resources to the young (forward) and 
vice versa (backward). 9 Forward altruism strengthens the resource curse results derived in 
subsection A, but backward altruism weakens them; if resources are sold to finance transfers 
to the altruistic old, they will consume part of these resources, but transfer the rest to their 
children, who will save. This will weaken the resource curse through the income effect 
channel result found above. The opposite happens if resources are transferred to the altruistic 
young. Below we will formalize this intuitive argument.  
                                                 
8 Changes in interest rates do not qualitatively change the results of this section because they are more moderate 
in the open economy than the closed economy, for which we have already offered a formal proof.  
9 Altonji, Ayashi and Kotlikoff (1997) present strong evidence against forward altruism using United States data 
at the micro level. Nevertheless, this section is presented to justify the robustness and applicability of our model 
to countries where altruism may be supported by data.  
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Suppose the old individuals transfer fraction  of their wealth to the young. 
Assume ( 1,1)   , where a positive value represents positive transfers from the old to the 
young (forward altruism) and a negative value represents the reverse (backward altruism). 
The transition equation (for the closed economy case) will be as follows: 
 
 
1
1
1 ]1
)1()1([)1()1)(1( 

 
 ot
t
ytttt gr
gkAk    [9]
Ceteris paribus, a positive (negative)  will bring the transition path of capital to a higher 
(lower) level. Whether resource curse (blessing) happens depends on whether 
1
(1 )(1 ) [ (1 ) ]
1yt ott
g
r
g   

      is negative (positive). For gyt=0 and got+1>0 resource curse 
(blessing) takes place if 
1
(1
1
)1 ) ]
tr
[ (   

    is negative (positive). We can thus conclude that 
a higher degree of forward altruism will tend to dampen the income effect. It is interesting to 
note that with altruistically enough parents (  big enough), transfers to the old through 
natural resources can also be a blessing to the economy. 
 
III.   EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
In this section, we empirically test theoretical results of the above model. First, we test the 
main result that the anticipation of government current spending financed by resource 
revenues will dampen non-hydrocarbon sector growth. Second, we test whether fewer 
restrictions on international goods and capital movements reduce the adverse impact of 
government current spending on non-hydrocarbon sector growth. Finally, we test if a higher 
degree of forward altruism dampens the impact of government current spending on non-
hydrocarbon sector growth. 
 
A.   Empirical Methodology 
We use a unique database, consisting of annual data for 25 oil-exporting countries over 
1992–2005. Appendix A describes sources of data (Table 4) and their descriptive statistics 
(Table 5). Due to some missing observations in the early 1990s and the removal of outliers in 
the estimation, on average, nine observations per country are used in the regressions. The list 
of countries included in the empirical investigation is also mentioned in Appendix A (Table 
6). The resource sector is the hydrocarbon sector, which includes oil/gas and its derivatives. 
The non-resource sector is the non-hydrocarbon sector. In the baseline empirical model, non-
hydrocarbon GDP growth (NH-GDPGrowthit ) is the dependent variable, and the following 
are the explanatory variables (in natural logarithm, unless otherwise indicated): 
 Lagged GDP per capita (yit-1), which captures the convergence of income per capita to 
its steady state level. 
 Government current spending as a percentage of non-hydrocarbon GDP (Spendingit), 
which proxies transfers to private agents and is anticipated at the prior time period   
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(t-1), similar to the theoretical model. We have assumed an extension of our two-
period model to a 55 period one, à la Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). All of the 
qualitative results derived for the two-period model apply to this extension as well.  
 Vector of control variables (Controlit ), which consists of the effects of other resource 
curse channels that are sketched in Figure 3 and are captured in the following 
variables: institutional quality index (Institutionit) measures the undermining of 
institutions channel and is proxied by political risk index from ICRG (2005); rate of 
change of real effective exchange rate (REERit) proxies the Dutch disease channel. 
The arrows in Figure 3 indicate the direction of the causality. Thus, a two-sided arrow 
indicates the potential non-univocal of the causality between two elements. 
We also test extensions of our theoretical model by including an additional vector of control 
variables (XControlit). This vector includes restrictions on international goods and capital 
movements (Restrictionsit), and interactions of government current spending with other 
variables (see Appendix A for complete descriptions). 
 
Figure 3. Resource Curse Channels 
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Our baseline empirical mode is as follows: 
itiitititti ControlSpendingyy    32110 10  
and our extension model is as follows: 
itiititititti XControlControlSpendingyy    431110  
i captures the unobservable invariant effects for country i, which among other things can 
capture the degree of altruism in country i in the absence of an explanatory variable for 
altruism. it  captures the remaining unobservable effects of country i at year t, and α’s are the 
estimation coefficients. 
B.   Results 
Table 2 shows the estimation results for our baseline specification, using two estimators that 
are fixed-effects ordinary least square (OLS) and generalized method of moments (GMM). 
Hausmann tests supported the choice of the fixed effects OLS model over the random effects 
model. The results using the fixed-effects OLS estimator with lagged dependent variables are 
presented in Column (1) in Table 2.  A potential issue arising from using fixed-effects OLS 
estimator to estimate a lagged dependent model is a bias of order 0 (1/T), with T being the 
length of the time period of the sample. Column (2) presents the results of our preferred 
specification using Arrellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998), Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimators, which corrects for the bias arising from the use of 
lagged dependent variables in the fixed effect model. 11 In addition, we used instrumental 
variables techniques to correct for the endogeneity bias that may arise from the inclusion of 
some of the endogenous regressors in the specification, using up to three-year lagged 
variables as instruments. We also used the unit value of hydrocarbon export and time 
dummies as instruments for government current spending. We assume that movement in the 
unit value of hydrocarbon exports affects non-hydrocarbon growth only through its impact on 
fiscal policy. That assumption is supported by the some of the results of the estimation of a 
VAR model using a selected number of oil-exporting countries, as documented in Husain et 
al. (2008). The use of instrumental variables technique allows us to assert the causal impact 
of government current spending on non-hydrocarbon growth. Results presented in columns 
(1) and (2) in Table 2 are qualitatively similar, albeit the income effect is stronger when 
correcting for endogeneity. 
 
                                                 
10 We estimate the reduced form of this model as 
follows: itiitititti ControlSpendingyy    32110 ' , where 11 1'    
11 First order and second order serial correlation tests and Hansen test relating to the validity of over identifying 
moment conditions indicate that the estimated models presented in the paper are correctly specified. 
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Testing for whether government current spending dampens non-hydrocarbon GDP 
growth 
 
The estimation results reported in column (2) of Table 2 support our main theoretical 
prediction and can be summarized as follows. It should be noted that these results are robust 
across different specifications, the use of different proxies for institutional quality and the 
inclusion of outliers.12 
 
 The coefficient associated with lagged non-hydrocarbon GDP is negative (estimated 
at -0.08). The higher the lagged level of non-hydrocarbon sector GDP is, the lower 
the contemporaneous non-hydrocarbon sector GDP growth will be.  
 The coefficient of current expenditure is estimated at -0.18, implying that an increase 
in current spending of 1 percent of non-hydrocarbon GDP reduces the non-
hydrocarbon sector growth by about 0.2 percent. This result supports the main 
prediction of our theoretical model. One might argue that not all of government 
current spending reduces private saving. Fortunately, our dataset includes data on 
government spending with some degree of disaggregating on wage and interest rate 
payments, albeit for a shorter sample of countries and periods. Using non-wage 
government primary spending, we also find that the coefficient associated with that 
proxy is negative in the non-hydrocarbon sector growth regressions. 
 The coefficient associated with institutional quality index is positive (estimated at 
0.016) suggesting that an improvement in institutional quality leads to an increase in 
growth performances in the non-hydrocarbon sector. This result is consistent with the 
undermining institutions channel, which indicates that the presence of natural 
resources, through their impact on institutional arrangements, affects non-resource 
sector development. More generally, this result is consistent with the literature that 
has emphasized the importance of institutional arrangements in determining 
economic growth (see for instance Rodrick et al. (2004)). 
 The coefficient associated with REER is positive (estimated at 0.0001) but is not 
statistically significant. Thus, we do not find evidence for Dutch disease in our 
dataset. Government intervention and price controls are likely to “sterilize” the price 
effect resulting from increased spending directed toward non-tradable goods. In 
addition, many countries included in the sample (e.g. transition countries) have 
experienced a sharp decrease in their nominal effective exchange rate during the 
period covered by sample. In addition, a lot of oil-exporting countries given their peg 
                                                 
12 To account for the presence of outliers, observations with excessively high leverage have been excluded from 
the sample. More precisely, all observations with DFBETAi,j statistics, with i indicating the country and j the 
time period, that have an absolute value above a cutoff point equal to 2/√n, with n being the number of 
observations in the original sample (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993, pp. 32-39 and Besley, Kuh and Welsch, 
1980) were dropped. The results presented in the paper are robust to the use of different values for the cutoff 
point above which observations are dropped. Table 3 of Appendix A presents the countries included in the study 
after the removal of outliers. 
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vis-à-vis the dollar have experienced a decrease in their nominal effective exchange 
rate as a result as the weakening of the dollar currency vis-à-vis other trading partners 
in the time period studied. That decrease in their nominal effective exchange rate 
coupled with a relative moderate domestic CPI inflation led to a decrease in the 
REER for many countries included in the sample, as suggested in Table 5 in 
Appendix A. 
In order, to test the robustness of the specification of our core regression, we augmented it 
with government capital spending to capture its impact on private investment and in turn on 
economic growth. Our main results are virtually unchanged and the coefficient associated 
with government capital spending is not statistically significant. Our results are also robust 
when using a three-year average data frequency instead of a yearly frequency in order to 
smooth out the business cycle. 
Table 2. Growth Regressions 
Dependent variable: NH-GDP Growth OLS Fixed Effects GMM-SYS
(1) (2)
Initial NH-GDP per capita -0.2434*** -0.0827
(0.0482) (0.0536)
Spending -0.0646** -0.183**
(0.0299) (0.0808)
Institution 0.0036** 0.0156***
(0.0014) (0.0037)
REER 0.0004 0.0001
(0.0005) (0.0016)
R-squared 0.678
Hansen test 0.162
Serial correlation test (first order) 0.014
Serial correlation test (second order) 0.178
Number of countries 25 25
Observations 221 221
Country dummies are included in the various specifications but estimates are not shown.
Observations with excessively high leverage have been dropped from the sample.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
Testing whether more openness dampens the adverse effect of government current 
spending on non-hydrocarbon GDP growth 
 
We further test the theoretical prediction that a higher degree of openness on international 
goods and capital movements dampens the reduction in investment in the private non-
hydrocarbon sector generated by the expectation of government current spending. To do so, 
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we augment the baseline specification with an interaction term between government current 
spending and an index of restriction to international capital and goods movements, as 
discussed previously. Restrictionsit is a simple average of four dummies of exchange 
arrangements and exchange restrictions taken from taken from IMF (2007b) namely the 
presence of multiple exchange rate practice, current account restrictions, capital account 
restrictions and surrenders of exports. A value of one for the Restrictionsit indicator implies 
that the country is closed to international movements of goods and capital and zero implies 
that the country is open to those movements. Other proxies, such as de facto openness to 
movements of goods and services, non-hydrocarbon openness were considered but not 
selected. Given the lack of diversification of most oil-exporting economies, that indicator is 
more likely to capture the lack of diversification than the degree of openness of government 
policies towards international trade in goods and service. In addition, indicators such as de 
facto financial integration are likely to capture large accumulation of foreign assets financed 
through large oil revenues rather than the degree of openness of government policies toward 
capital movements. 
The results, presented in Table 3, support the theoretical predictions that fewer restrictions 
dampen the negative impact of government current spending on non-hydrocarbon sector 
development. We focus on column (4) that uses a specification excluding the variable 
Institution from the specification. Indeed, Restriction is likely to be collinear with Institution. 
The coefficients associated with Spending and its interaction with Restriction need now to be 
considered together to assess the adverse effect of current spending on the performance of the 
non-hydrocarbon sector. As shown in Appendix A, Restriction ranges from zero to one. 
Thus, the absence of restrictions on goods and capital movements in a given country will lead 
to a positive impact of current spending on non-hydrocarbon sector development as indicated 
by the coefficient associated with current expenditure in column (4) in Table 3. In the 
opposite case where there would be a high degree of restriction to goods and capital 
international movements in a given country, the implied coefficient associated with the 
impact of current spending equals 0.29 minus 0.70, which is negative. 
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Table 3. Growth Regressions using Restrictions on Trade and Capital Flows 
Dependent variable: NH-GDP Growth OLS Fixed Effects GMM-SYS OLS Fixed Effects GMM-SYS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial NH-GDP per capita -0.2544***  -0.1474*** -0.2477*** -0.2154***
( 0.0474) (0.0535) (0.0483) (0.0944)
Spending -0.0354 -0.0285 -0.0488 0.291**
(0.0484) (0.117) (0.0476) (0.141)
Institution 0.0035** 0.0121***
(0.0014) (0.0040)
REER 0.0003 0.0005 0.0005 0.0021
(0.0005) (0.0014) (0.0005) (0.0020)
Restriction 0.154 0.889 0.217 2.254**
(0.253) (0.687) (0.246) (0.921)
Spending × Restriction -0.0590 -0.275 -0.0780 -0.701**
(0.0802) (0.210) (0.0774) (0.308)
R-squared 0.68 0.67
Hansen test 0.729 0.510
Serial correlation test (first order) 0.039 0.056
Serial correlation test (second order) 0.147 0.077
Number of countries 25 25 25 25
Observations 221 221 221 221
Country dummies are included in the various specifications but estimates are not shown.
Observations with excessively high leverage have been dropped from the sample.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
Appendix B presents the empirical results with mixed support for the impact of altruism on 
the income effect channel of the resource curse. 
 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
The paper provides an alternative explanation for the “resource curse” based on the income 
effect resulting from the high level of government current expenditures in resource rich 
economies. Using a simple life cycle framework, we show that private investment in the non-
resource sector is negatively affected by current transfers financed through natural resource 
revenues. This happens because expectation of transfers dampens savings within the 
economy. We show that higher degrees of openness and forward altruism reduce this adverse 
effect. We find empirical support for the main theoretical predictions by estimating non-
hydrocarbon sector growth regressions using panel data for 25 oil-exporting countries over 
the period 1992 to 2005. Policy implications for dampening this channel of resource curse 
would be to limit current transfers, further liberalize international goods and capital 
movements and introduce policies that promote domestic private investment. 
This paper studies the resource curse in the standard context of capital accumulation and 
growth. However, our model is rich enough to study welfare implications of this channel of 
resource curse. 
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Our model can be extended in a number of directions. Including human capital accumulation 
could potentially link lower investment in human capital to the provision of such high 
transfers in resource-rich countries. Allowing for labor supply endogeneity will enable us to 
explain lower labor supply in resource rich countries resulting from the expectation of future 
transfers. Those model extensions will allow for a richer income effect explanation of the 
resource curse.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A. Data 
Table 4. Data Description 
Database Units Descriptor Code
Ossowski and al. (2006) and 
World Bank (2007) Percentage Non-hydrocarbon PPP adjusted GDP annual growth per capita NH-GDP Growth
Ossowski and al. (2006) and 
World Bank (2007) Per capita constant international US$ PPP adjusted One year lagged non-hydrocarbon GDP Initial NH-GDP
Ossowski and al. (2006) Percentage of non-hydrocarbon GDP Central government current expenditures Spending
ICRG (2006) Index number Institutional quality  Institution
IMF (2007c) Percentage lagged value of REER rate of change REER
IMF (2007b) Index number Restrictions on goods and capital movements (average) Restriction
Ossowski and al. (2006) Percentage of non-hydrocarbon GDP
Non-hydrocarbon exports plus imports over non-hydrocarbon 
GDP NH-openness
Ossowski and al. (2006) Percentage of non-hydrocarbon GDP Central government capital expenditures Capital investment
Ossowski and al. (2006) US$/barrel Natural logarithm of crude oil export unit value Oil price  
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics 
id Country mean stdv mean stdv mean stdv mean stdv mean stdv
1 Algeria -4.3 8.4 32.0 2.2 2.3 0.3 -2.3 10.3 0.8 0.0
2 Angola 1.9 22.7 97.3 26.4 2.2 0.3 1.0 65.9 0.8 0.1
3 Azerbaijan 10.4 27.2 28.2 6.9 2.8 0.1 -1.6 7.2 0.5 0.2
4 Bahrain 0.9 7.0 29.4 1.4 3.7 0.4 -0.9 4.6 0.0 0.0
5 Brunei n.a. n.a. 71.7 9.4 4.4 0.2 -0.7 3.2 0.4 0.1
6 Cameroon 0.2 9.3 16.2 1.8 2.2 0.4 -2.8 12.9 0.7 0.2
7 Chad -1.8 6.3 10.0 1.5 n.a. n.a. -3.0 13.7 0.7 0.1
8 Congo -6.0 18.0 51.1 7.0 2.5 0.2 -0.1 12.0 0.7 0.1
9 Ecuador -2.7 9.2 21.6 1.7 3.1 0.2 2.3 15.3 0.4 0.3
10 Equatorial Guine -1.6 16.7 36.2 14.6 n.a. n.a. 0.9 13.8 0.7 0.1
11 Gabon -4.2 13.7 35.2 5.1 2.5 0.3 -3.4 12.1 0.7 0.1
12 Indonesia -0.7 8.1 13.5 4.6 2.4 0.6 -2.1 25.1 0.1 0.1
13 Iran -2.4 5.8 19.5 3.4 3.7 0.6 -0.3 17.0 0.8 0.2
14 Kazakhstan 3.0 6.0 20.7 1.9 3.3 0.1 3.5 13.1 0.6 0.2
15 Kuwait -3.8 14.7 78.2 18.8 3.6 0.3 0.0 4.4 0.0 0.0
16 Libya n.a. n.a. 46.6 17.2 n.a. n.a. -15.6 30.4 0.8 0.1
17 Mexico -0.5 3.8 21.4 0.9 3.0 0.3 -0.3 14.5 0.2 0.2
18 Nigeria 0.5 12.5 39.3 16.2 2.1 0.6 3.4 29.6 0.8 0.2
19 Norway 0.4 4.5 53.8 2.7 5.2 0.2 -0.2 3.5 0.1 0.2
20 Oman -0.3 10.2 55.6 3.9 3.8 0.2 -2.3 4.6 0.1 0.1
21 Qatar n.a. n.a. 62.8 4.3 3.8 0.4 1.1 4.2 0.1 0.1
22 Russia 2.6 4.7 43.2 1.9 2.4 0.4 3.2 17.1 0.7 0.2
23 Saudi Arabia -1.5 7.3 50.3 5.6 3.5 0.2 -1.2 4.6 0.0 0.1
24 Sudan 1.2 3.1 11.7 5.3 1.3 0.3 2.4 13.4 0.6 0.3
25 Syria -3.0 6.8 21.7 2.9 3.7 0.4 -1.9 5.3 1.0 0.1
26 Timor n.a. n.a. 15.9 4.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0 0.0
27 Trinidad and Tob 0.3 7.1 33.7 2.6 2.9 0.4 -0.7 4.5 0.1 0.1
28 UAE -1.9 6.6 40.0 6.6 3.2 0.2 1.1 4.6 0.0 0.0
29 Venezuela -4.8 8.1 25.0 4.7 3.2 0.4 2.6 16.1 0.4 0.4
30 Vietnam 3.9 2.1 16.8 1.6 3.4 0.3 0.9 5.4 0.7 0.1
31 Yemen -2.6 9.4 34.3 6.4 2.7 0.5 6.8 9.6 0.3 0.4
median -0.7 33.7 3.1 -0.2 0.5
RestrictionNH-GDP Growth Spending Institution REER
 
 
Table 6. List of Countries Included in the Sample 
Indonesia Algeria Angola Norway Ecuador
Vietnam Azerbaijan Cameroon Russia Mexico
Bahrain Congo Trinidad and Tobago
Iran Gabon Venezuela
Kazakhstan Nigeria
Kuwait
Oman
Saudi Arabia
Sudan
Syria
UAE
Yemen
Total
2 12 5 2 4
Western Hemisphere
Number of countries:
Middle East and Central 
AsiaAsia Sub-Saharan Europe
25  
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Appendix B. Testing for Whether a Higher Degree of Altruism Dampens the Adverse Effect 
of Government Current Spending on Non-Hydrocarbon GDP Growth 
 
We test the theoretical prediction that a higher degree of forward altruism dampens the 
adverse impact on saving resulting from current expenditure on non-hydrocarbon sector 
growth. To do so, we augment the core specification with an interaction term between current 
spending and regional dummies.13 Therefore, we proceed to proxy altruism using regional 
dummies. The results are presented in Table 7. Column (1) indicates that Western 
Hemisphere followed by Middle East are the most severely affected by the impact of current 
spending on non-hydrocarbon sector growth even after controlling for institutional quality. 
Indeed, the coefficient associated with the individual effect of government spending on non-
hydrocarbon GDP growth by default corresponds to that effect on the Western Hemisphere. 
Indeed, in column (1), the coefficient associated with the interaction between government 
current spending and Middle East dummy is estimated to be 0.20, which is lower than the 
absolute value of the negative coefficient associated with government current spending, 0.26. 
However, it should be noted that column (2) in Table 7, which uses GMM techniques and 
corrects for potential endogeneity bias, does not indicate any significant interactive effect of 
government spending with regional dummies. Those results should be interpreted with 
caution, given the small number of countries that we could include in those regional groups 
(due to data availability) and the questionable adequacy of using dummies to capture the 
degree of altruism. 
 
                                                 
13 Survey data could be used to proxy the degree of forward altruism but such data is not available for many of 
the countries in our sample. 
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Table 7. Growth Regressions using Regional Dummies 
Dependent variable: NH-GDP Growth OLS Fixed Effects GMM-SYS
(1) (2)
Initial NH-GDP per capita -0.2518*** -0.1699**
(0.0495) (0.0786)
Spending -0.260** -0.0578
(0.109) (0.105)
Spending × Africa Dummy 0.188 -0.0697
(0.115) (0.0436)
Spending × Asia Dummy 0.274** 0.0002
(0.107) (0.0243)
Spending × Middle East Dummy 0.197* 0.0228
(0.117) (0.0345)
Spending × Europe Dummy 0.444 -0.0699
(0.278) (0.126)
Institution 0.0035** 0.0157***
(0.0016) (0.0053)
REER 0.0002 0.0011
(0.0005) (0.0013)
R-squared 0.68
Hansen test 0.949
Serial correlation test (first order) 0.019
Serial correlation test (second order) 0.191
Number of countries 25 25
Observations 221 221
Country dummies are included in the various specifications but estimates are not shown.
Observations with excessively high leverage have been dropped from the sample.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Appendix C. Regional integration of two large open economies 
 
Consider a world with only two economies, home and foreign, each similar to the closed 
economy studied in subsection A. The home economy variables are exactly like before. The 
foreign variables will be differentiated with “*” superscripts (e.g., l*, k* …). The world 
economy variables will has superscript “w”. Assume have different populations, but have are 
the same in other parameters (α, β, and At). In addition, assume that capital markets of the 
two countries are open to each other. The latter assumption leads to the equalization of 
interest rates (rt) in both countries. Capital transition equation of the world economy will be 
as follows: 
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The analysis for the effects of changes in spending will be qualitatively similar to the closed 
economy, with two differences: in the large open economy case, changes in spending in the 
home country will also affect the foreign country, and have dampened effect for on the home 
country with a factor of *NN
N
 . For example, if got increases will cause resource curse in 
both home and foreign countries, but the magnitude of curse at home will smaller than the 
case of closed economy. 
